Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2014

Paul D. Moreno's The American State from the Civil War to the
New Deal: The Twilight of Constitutionalism and the Triumph of
Progressivism
Laura Phillips Sawyer
Associate Professor University of Georgia School of Law, LPhillipsSawyer@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Laura Phillips Sawyer, Paul D. Moreno's The American State from the Civil War to the New Deal: The
Twilight of Constitutionalism and the Triumph of Progressivism , 67 Econ. Hist. Soc'y 1186 (2014),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1358

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @
University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited
from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

1186

BOOK REVIEWS

Paul D. Moreno, The American state from the Civil War to the New Deal: the twilight of
constitutionalism and the triumph of progressivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013. Pp. xvi + 349. ISBN 9781107655010 Pbk. £19.99)
Paul Moreno, the Grewcock Chair in Constitutional History at Hillsdale College, sets out
to explain how the natural rights constitutionalism of the Founders was replaced by an
‘entitlement-based welfare state of modern liberalism’ by the late 1930s. The book is an
‘analytic narrative’, drawing on both constitutional theory and current ‘public choice’ law
and economics, and contributes to recent scholarship by libertarian-minded legal scholars,
such as David Bernstein and David Mayer, among others.
The book is divided into four parts, following conventional periodization: old regime,
1870–1900; early progressivism, 1900–13; late progressivism, 1913–33; and New Deal,
1933–40. The first section argues that sectional animosity divided northern labourers and
southern agrarians, which limited class demands for redistribution policies, then called
‘class legislation’, but favoured industrial elites by maintaining protective tariffs and the
gold standard. Additionally, the Republican Party and the Supreme Court maintained a
fidelity to constitutionally limited government that manifested itself in ‘liberty of contract’
and free interstate commerce.
The middle sections explain that both liberals, who supported utilitarianism and developed sociological jurisprudence, and conservatives, like Christopher Langdell who pioneered the case method at Harvard Law, began ‘the work of tearing down the Founders’ view
of the law’ (p. 51). Moreno reiterates the work of revisionist legal scholars who have shown
that legal formalism of the late nineteenth century resulted from neither laissez-faire
economics nor Social Darwinism per se, but rather arose from free labour ideology and a
tradition of formal equal rights. The sociological jurisprudence and legal realism that
replaced Gilded Age constitutionalism, Moreno shows, led to the expansion of police powers
in protective legislation, such as women’s minimum wage and pure food and drug laws.
There were also egregious misuses of this new power, such as Buck v. Bell, which upheld the
forced sterilization of citizens deemed mentally unfit. While this is of course not a new
finding, most modern liberals view this case and other atrocities, such as Jim Crow laws, as
an embarrassing anomaly; Moreno argues that these and other incidents were predictable
outcomes fostered by intellectual elites, entrenched interest groups, and even labour unions.
Moreno is at his best in describing how the progressive notion of the ‘living constitution’
slowly altered US jurisprudence through intellectual movements, judicial appointments,
administrative reforms, and the expansion of executive powers. These eventually culminated in the New Deal constitutional revolution of 1937. Watershed moments preceding
the New Deal, such as the First World War, which Moreno calls ‘the first New Deal’
(p. 164), radically reshaped the powers of the state—raising the federal income tax,
weakening antitrust, strengthening unions, and abridging free speech rights. Despite
several postwar rulings striking down protective legislation, such as a women’s minimum
wage in Washington DC or the Federal Child Labour Act, the tide of natural rights
constitutionalism continued to recede. Even President Herbert Hoover, who has been
castigated as too conservative, enacted ‘proto-New Deal policies’ (p. 219). Ultimately, the
exigencies of the Great Depression created greater demand for economic intervention and
the Court succumbed to these pressures. The constitutional revolution of 1937 solidified
this sea change, which Moreno ably explains resulted not from President Franklin
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan but rather the external pressures of the Great Depression
and the continued ascent of legal realism within the bench and bar. In the end, the Court
elevated civil liberties above economic rights in its famous Carolene Products case, but, as
Moreno argues, this had been a long time coming.
This book provides a sweeping history of US state development, charting the rise of
progressive-liberal thought, policy, and law. The admirable breadth of the book, however,
limits its depth of analysis. This must be the case for any synthesis history, even those with
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such extensive footnotes. Yet, with each advance in progressive law and policy, the author
poses natural rights objections that require greater exposition. It would have been helpful
to explain more fully ‘Madisonian standards of constitutionalism’ and natural rights theory
upfront.Then, the author might have explored how that vision would have offered different
policy responses to social questions ranging from industrial working conditions, unionization, anti-monopoly sentiment, and economic crises. The author frequently cites public
choice objections to progressive laws or legal reasoning, either demonstrating interest
group rent-seeking or unintended consequences. However, those consequentialist objections could be true without necessarily supporting natural rights constitutionalism. Those
same arguments could be used to support better public interest legislation, as scholars in
public policy history and American political development have shown. While surely it is
true that progressives replaced natural rights constitutionalism, it appears that very few
scholars and politicians fought for their preservation.
Much of this book draws from revisionist narratives of American legal and political
history; however, the book’s lament of the ‘progressive abandonment of the governmentprotected natural rights of the Declaration of Independence for a set of government-provided
rights of economic security’ (p. 225) makes it distinct. This is a call to action. The book
begins by characterizing the recent passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2009 as provoking ‘an unprecedented debate over the nature and purpose of American government’ (p. 1).
It concludes that ‘constitutionalists could still challenge . . . liberal statism’ (p. 328). Many
historians will take issue with this wide-ranging legal and political history, especially its call
for activism to roll back the jurisprudence of modern liberalism.
Harvard Business School
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Donald K. Stabile and Andrew F. Kozak, Markets, planning and the moral economy: business
cycles in the Progressive Era and the New Deal (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2012. Pp. 296.
ISBN 9781781006764 Hbk. £80)
The global financial crisis spawned an academic industry exploring what went wrong. It
also, however, triggered a re-examination of the moral and philosophical debates that
ensued after the Great Depression, specifically upon the role of planning and government
intervention within the economy. The ideological debate between those who defend the
free market economy and those who wanted a moral economy in the form of regulation and
planning is, of course, nothing new. In 1988 President George H. W. Bush called for ‘a
kinder and gentler nation’, that is, allowing the market economy to have a more defined
moral purpose, and equally, generate a fairer society.That sentiment quickly vanished with
the great moderation where market economies seemed to perform well and the business
cycle had reportedly died. Another American president, George W. Bush, gave tax cuts
geared towards the wealthy on the fable that it would give the economy a supply-side boost.
It immediately flung America’s public finances into deficit. In the last seven years we have
seen, too, the bright return of Keynesian economics quickly followed by its eclipse.
Keynesianism, not the bail-out of Wall Street, is now blamed for lumbering economies with
monstrous public debt.
Stabile and Kozak, who favour government intervention and extensive planning to temper
business cycles, explore the perennial debate between the moral economy and the market
economy. The book’s primary focus is upon the progressive movement which flowered in
early twentieth-century America and whether it had any impact on public policy. Despite
having a considerable pedigree in progressive economic thought with its founding father,
Edward Bellamy, followed by leading thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, Theodore
Roosevelt, and John Maurice Clark, most American economists have always entertained a
sceptical view of government involvement within their economy.This was the case even after
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